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THE DEBT FINANCING OF
PARENTHOOD
MELISSA B. JACOBY*
I
INTRODUCTION
In the department of controversy, a market for babies enjoys a prime place.
From proposals to liberalize adoption pricing in the 1970s to technological
advances in assisted reproduction today, family expansion that requires
intermediaries raises questions for nearly every academic discipline and many
fields of law.
Throughout these debates, people from across the ideological spectrum
often maintain that babies and related rights should not be sold. A small group
of scholars has started to approach assisted reproduction, surrogacy, and
adoption with the same analytical tools that they would apply to less-contested
markets.1 Such work is central to improving the provision of goods and services
relating to parenthood and family expansion. But, so far, it has largely left
unexplored the role of debt financing and particularly repeat-playing lenders in
this industry.
This article reflects on the role of lenders in the parenthood market and how
they might facilitate access and shape this industry in more profound ways.
Standing at a kiosk within a fertility clinic, a forty-two-year-old woman of
modest means can seek approval, in minutes, of a $20,000 Capital One Fertility
installment loan at 25.99% interest for a round of in vitro fertilization (IVF) and
the eggs of a younger woman.2 Lenders also promote and distribute such
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1. See, e.g., DEBORA L. SPAR, THE BABY BUSINESS: HOW MONEY, SCIENCE, AND POLITICS
DRIVE THE COMMERCE OF CONCEPTION 3–6 (2006).
2. See infra III.
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unsecured installment loans through sellers of IVF package deals and moneyback guarantees.
Lenders are regularly in the business of financing adoption costs too. Via
foundations and agencies, Bank of America offers unsecured adoption loans in
amounts up to $25,000, while JP Morgan Chase has offered a “Chase New
Additions” adoption home-equity line of credit for significantly larger sums.3
Foundations and nonprofit adoption agencies that offer loans sometimes refrain
from charging interest at all, or they charge low rates normally associated with
borrowers who are practically risk-free. But these lenders may attach other
strings that relate to the child’s origin or such characteristics of the potential
parent as religious observance, marital status, sexual orientation, and adherence
to traditional gender roles.4
The development of specific products and marketing channels is consistent
with claims that the posited parenthood market exists and is thriving. This
makes it important to shift the focus from the threshold inquiry of such a
market’s desirability to the best regulatory structure. It also forces one to
consider whether the addition of lenders to this market might relieve or
exacerbate the conditions that give people pause about parenthood markets in
the first place.
This task is especially critical for assisted reproduction. Mainstream fertilitytreatment lending complicates a common narrative that most people cannot
access these services unless they have insurance coverage or “happen to be
rich.”5 Although calls for regulation have not necessarily abated on this basis,6
the presumption that only a small set of elite customers could buy access has
perhaps eased the urgency of these demands. Even if people long have
borrowed money on an ad hoc basis for access to fertility treatment and
adoptions, the distribution of consumer credit products through fertility clinics
and other related channels could increase demand and access to IVF and
related procedures considerably. Lack of insurance coverage is not a reliable
substitute for substantive oversight of the assisted-reproduction industry.
Repeat-playing institutional lenders should be recognized as relevant to
political-economy analysis of the parenthood market. These lenders may
improve or aggravate a variety of issues in this market, which in turn can affect

3. See infra III.
4. See infra III.
5. CHARIS THOMPSON, MAKING PARENTS: THE CHOREOGRAPHY OF REPRODUCTIVE
TECHNOLOGIES 26–27 (2005).
6. A list of scholars’ calls for regulation can be found in Jaime King, Predicting Probability:
Regulating the Future of Preimplantation Genetic Screening, 8 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS
283, 288 n.20 (2008); Michael J. Malinowski, Creating Life? Examining the Legal, Ethical, and Medical
Issues of Assisted Reproductive Technologies: A Law-Policy Proposal to Know Where Babies Come
from During the Reproductive Revolution, 9 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 549, 552 (2006). For arguments
against regulation, see Martha M. Ertman, What’s Wrong with a Parenthood Market? A New and
Improved Theory of Commodification, 82 N.C. L. REV. 1, 22 (2003) (discussing the benefits to
nontraditional parents of the lack of public regulation of the parenthood market).
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the need or demand for regulation. This article notes several possible contexts
in which these lenders might affect the distribution of goods and services in
assisted reproduction, including egg-supplier compensation, expanding
parenthood possibilities for same-sex couples, and quality control of IVF.
Section II introduces the issue of financing assisted reproduction and
adoption. Section III reviews specialty loans for assisted reproduction and
adoption, reflecting traditional research in case law and legal and nonlegal
scholarly literature, as well as results from a review of news media and Web
sites of prominent intermediaries and service suppliers. Section IV presents a
sampling of political-economy implications relevant to assisted reproduction,
leaving other issues for future investigation. Section V concludes.
II
PARENTHOOD MARKET FINANCE: BACKGROUND
A. Fertility Barriers and Options
The traditional and common definition of infertility covers those who have
not conceived after a designated period of unprotected heterosexual
intercourse.7 But assisted reproduction is also important to those with
“structural infertility”—that is, those who want to be parents but do not want to
engage in heterosexual intercourse.8
Assisted-reproduction specialists and clinics charge a lot of money to
attempt to surmount fertility barriers of either kind. Artificial or alternative
insemination is among the least invasive and the cheapest options, but still may
cost over $1000 for the initial round.9 The price of just one round of IVF or
related processes far exceeds what an average household of four spends out of

7. See, e.g., SPAR, supra note 1, at 1–2, 31 (“Roughly 10 to 15 percent of all adults experience
some form of infertility.”). Infertility is difficult to measure because many do not report to their
doctors. See Michele Goodwin, Assisted Reproductive Technology and the Double Bind: The Illusory
Choice of Motherhood, 9 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 1, 18 (2005) (“Poorer women, who lack health
coverage, are likely to be disproportionately underrepresented or unaccounted for with infertility
statistics.”). For racial differences in diagnosing infertility, see also DOROTHY ROBERTS, KILLING THE
BLACK BODY: RACE, REPRODUCTION, AND THE MEANING OF LIBERTY 255 (1997).
8. Judith F. Daar, Accessing Reproductive Technologies: Invisible Barriers, Indelible Harms, 23
BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 18, 24 (2008); see also Ertman, supra note 6; Charles P. Kindregan Jr.
& Steven H. Snyder, Clarifying the Law of ART: The New American Bar Association Model Act
Governing Assisted Reproductive Technology, 42 FAM. L.Q. 203, 226–27 (2008) (discussing a more
inclusive definition of infertility that includes “the desire to achieve pregnancy by means other than
sexual intercourse”); Lars Noah, Assisted Reproductive Technologies and the Pitfalls of Unregulated
Biomedical Innovation, 55 FLA. L. REV. 603, 613 (2003).
9. Ertman, supra note 6, at 15; cf. Amy B. Monahan, Value-Based Mandated Health Benefits 25
(Univ. of Minn., Working Paper No. 25, 2008) (citing a range of monthly costs for ovulation stimulation
and artificial insemination from $200 to $5000, depending on drugs and medical monitoring). Artificial
insemination is the most frequently used. See John A. Robertson, Gay and Lesbian Access to Assisted
Reproductive Technology, 55 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 323, 324, 349 (2004).
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pocket on health care for an entire year.10 Employing a gestational surrogate
costs tens of thousands of dollars in jurisdictions in which the parties believe
courts will enforce the underlying contracts.11
Although the comparison is sometimes resisted, adoption is functionally an
alternative route to family expansion for those with fertility barriers.12 Adoption
costs vary greatly depending on the type of adoption and the characteristics of
the child.13 Adopting children from foster care is relatively inexpensive, at least
in terms of up-front costs.14 But costs for many adoptions can be $30,000 or
more.15
Some couples with fertility barriers “want what to them is irreplaceable, and
they will frequently pay whatever they can. They will mortgage their houses,
sell their cars, deplete the family savings.”16 Others with fertility barriers refrain
10. For IVF costs, see SPAR, supra note 1, at 59 tbl.2-3 (listing costs at representative clinics).
According to the latest Medical Expenditure Panel Survey, out-of-pocket expenditure on healthinsurance premiums in 2004 was $2336 for a family of three or more persons. DIDEM BERNARD &
JESSICA BANTHIN, MED. EXPENDITURE PANEL SURVEY, FAMILY-LEVEL EXPENDITURES ON
HEALTH CARE AND INSURANCE PREMIUMS AMONG THE U.S. NONELDERLY POPULATION, 2004, at
5, 13 (2007). Mean total expenditures for privately insured families were $6430. Id. at 2.
11. Gestational surrogacy costs range from $30,000 to $120,000. SPAR, supra note 1, at 92, 96
(describing prices as of 2004). On who actually profits from such transactions, see Kimberly D.
Krawiec, Altruism and Intermediation in the Market for Babies, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 203 (2009).
12. SPAR, supra note 1, at 210 (“Both sides of this market would prefer to believe that they are not
substitutes for one another. But in reality, of course, they are.”); Krawiec, supra note 11 (noting that
intended parents for whom assisted reproduction is unsuccessful or unavailable may resort to
adoption). On whether it is truly a substitute, see Gillian Hewitson, The Market for Surrogate
Motherhood Contracts, 73 ECON. RECORD 212, 213 (1997). On the social construction of the preference
for biological children, see, for example, ELIZABETH BARTHOLET, FAMILY BONDS: ADOPTION,
INFERTILITY, AND THE NEW WORLD OF CHILD PRODUCTION 93 (1993); ROBERTS, supra note 7, at
267 (referring to the desire for genetically related children as “cultural artifact”); id. at 260 (“Infertile
white couples are expected to turn to adoption only as a last resort, after exhausting every available
means of producing a genetically related child. The Black community, on the other hand, expects its
financially secure members to reach out to the thousands of Black children in need of a home.”). See
generally SPAR, supra note 1, at 160; Susan Freilich Appleton, Adoption in the Age of Reproductive
Technology, 2004 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 393, 432 (observing that adoption agencies encourage potential
parents to think of adoption as a last resort “by rejecting prospective adopters who are simultaneously
exploring medical interventions to have a child”); Robin Fretwell Wilson, Uncovering the Rationale for
Requiring Infertility in Surrogacy Arrangements, 29 AM. J.L. & MED. 337, 340 (2003) (discussing how
states used to give adoption preference to people with known infertility). For a historical perspective,
see Viviana A. Zelizer, From Baby Farms to Baby M, SOCIETY, March 1988, at 23, 24 (reviewing
changes to the value of children to adults generally and noting that “[b]y 1937, infant adoption was
being touted as the latest American fad.”).
13. See Michele Goodwin, The Free-Market Approach to Adoption: The Value of a Baby, 26 B.C.
THIRD WORLD L.J. 61, 66–67 (2006) (comparing costs of adoption for white and black infants).
14. See Solangel Maldonado, Discouraging Racial Preferences in Adoptions, 39 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 1415, 1441 (2006) (debunking the myth that international adoptions are cheaper than domestic
ones, particularly when compared to African American children).
15. See, e.g., SPAR, supra note 1, at 179 tbl.6-1 (listing domestic adoption-placement fees from 2004
for eight agencies, with only two charging on an income-based sliding scale); id. at 184 (listing foreignadoption fees by agency and specific program fees by country).
16. SPAR supra note 1, at 4; see also Elizabeth Heitman, Infertility as a Public Health Problem: Why
Assisted Reproductive Technologies Are Not the Answer, 6 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 89, 96 (1995)
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from assisted reproduction,17 or from adoption, or both.18 Although cost is not
the exclusive sorting factor,19 it certainly is an important one.20
B. Tax and Insurance
Tax laws offer some subsidies to intended parents. Medical expenses are
deductible from federal-tax obligations if they exceed 7.5% of an itemizing
taxpayer’s adjusted gross income.21 An Internal Revenue Service publication
condones using this deduction for fertility treatments, including IVF and
temporary storage of eggs or sperm.22 The federal tax code also provides an
adoption tax credit that phases out for wealthier families.23 One commentator

(“Infertile couples reportedly willing to try and to pay ‘almost anything’ to create their own baby are
not unlike many chronically ill Americans searching for a cure.”).
17. See, e.g., Marianne Bitler & Lucie Schmidt, Health Disparities and Infertility; Impacts of StateLevel Insurance Mandates, 85 FERTILITY & STERILITY 858, 859 (2006) (“Of the 6.2 million women with
impaired fecundity in 1995, 2.7 million (44%) had ever sought treatment.”); Daar, supra note 8, at 29
(“Generally, only half of all individuals who are diagnosed as infertile seek treatment to assist them in
reproduction.”); Dorothy Roberts, Race and the New Reproduction, 47 HASTINGS L.J. 935, 937, 941
(1996) (discussing possible reasons for racial disparities in the use of reproductive technology); Barton
H. Hamilton & Brian McManus, Infertility Treatment Markets: The Effects of Competition and Policy
3 (Oct. 2005) (unpublished manuscript, available at http://www.olin.wustl.edu/faculty/hamiltonb/
wpapers/Infertility%20Treatment%20Markets.pdf) (“Access to ART is a central issue in infertility
treatment because of the large difference between the number of American couples who report
reproductive difficulties and those who use ART.”).
18. See BARTHOLET, supra note 12, at 30–32 (“The adoption world does essentially nothing to
reach out to the infertile to educate them about adoption possibilities.”). For barriers to adoption
compared to reproductive medicine, see Appleton, supra note 12, at 444–46.
19. See ROBERTS, supra note 7, at 251–64 (stating “[b]lacks make up a disproportionate number of
infertile people avoiding reproductive technologies” and reviewing reasons beyond economic factors);
Daar, supra note 8, at 34–40 (including among barriers to access psychological factors and some
discrimination against certain groups); see also Hamilton & McManus, supra note 17, at 3–4 (discussing
how increased competition between clinics is an alternative method of expanding access, although
effects are not identical).
20. See SPAR, supra note 1, at 30 (“In this market . . . price acts harshly as a constraint on
demand.”).
21. 26 U.S.C. § 213(a) (2006).
22. I.R.S. Publication 502 (2008), available at http://www.irs.gov/publications/p502/index.html
(reporting that deductible expenses include procedures to “overcome an inability to have children”
including “[p]rocedures such as in vitro fertilization (including temporary storage of eggs or sperm)”
and reversal surgery and other procedures). Medical care is “the diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment,
or prevention of disease, or for the purpose of affecting any structure or function of the body.” 26
U.S.C. § 213(d)(1)(A) (2006). See generally Katherine T. Pratt, Inconceivable? Deducting the Costs of
Fertility Treatment, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 1121 (2004) (discussing the taxation of fertility treatment
costs); Anna L. Benjamin, Note, The Implications of Using the Medical Expense Deduction of I.R.C.
213 to Subsidize Assisted Reproductive Technology, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1117 (2004) (addressing
the implications of using the medical-expense deduction to subsidize fertility treatments).
23. For taxable years beginning in 2008, the maximum federal adoption tax credit is $11,650. 26
U.S.C. § 23(b)(1) (Supp. II 2008); Rev. Proc. 2007-66, 2007-45 I.R.B. 3–4. This adoption tax allowance
is a credit against taxes due under the Internal Revenue Code. § 23(a)(1). It can be carried forward if a
portion of the credit is unused, but it is not “refundable.” § 23(c)(1). The tax credit starts phasing out
for taxpayers with modified adjusted gross income exceeding $174,730 and is completely phased out if
income exceeds $214,730. Rev. Proc. 2007-66, 2007-45 I.R.B. 4.
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has asserted that this credit is sufficient to cover the costs of some domestic
adoptions out of foster care.24 Although the current federal-tax treatment can
incentivize family expansion, it does not help those lacking the means to pay the
up-front costs of adoption or fertility treatments. This perhaps explains the
heavy emphasis on insurance in debates about assisted-reproduction finance.
Most health-insurance plans do not directly cover assisted reproduction.25
Fewer than a third of states mandate that insurance plans cover some fertility
services or mandate that insurers offer coverage.26 For at least twenty years,
advocates of intended parents have been lobbying lawmakers to conceptualize
infertility as a disease or its treatment as a medical necessity and to adopt
mandates.27
In states where such mandates are in place, rates of access to assisted
reproduction have been significantly higher.28 But many people with fertility
barriers do not have coverage for fertility treatments even in those states. Some
people have no insurance for any medical care. Others are covered through selfinsuring employers, to which mandatory-coverage rules do not apply.29
According to one recent analysis, no state requires insurance coverage of IVF
or artificial insemination for same-sex couples.30
Still, if additional states or the federal government mandated coverage,
significantly more people would seek access to assisted reproduction.31
Commentators do not universally support this result. Some scholars are critical

24. Maldonado, supra note 14, at 1441 n.124.
25. By recent counts, about a quarter of health-insurance plans cover some fertility diagnoses or
treatments. Lucie Schmidt, Effects of Infertility Insurance Mandates on Fertility, 26 J. HEALTH ECON.
431, 432 (2007); see also Monahan, supra note 9, at 30 (offering estimates of large-employer coverage
for various diagnoses and treatments of infertility).
26. See NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, 50 STATES SUMMARY OF STATE LAWS
RELATED TO INSURANCE COVERAGE FOR INFERTILITY THERAPY (2008), available at
http://www.ncsl.org/programs/health/50infert.htm; American Society of Reproductive Medicine,
Frequently Asked Questions About Infertility, http://www.asrm.org/Patients/faqs.html#Q8 (last visited
June 23, 2008) (listing fourteen states whose laws “require insurers to either cover or offer to cover
some form of infertility diagnosis and treatment”).
27. Peter J. Neumann, Should Health Insurance Cover IVF? Issues and Options, 22 J. HEALTH
POL. POL’Y & L. 1215, 1217 (1997); Sonia L. Nazario, Infertility Insurance Gains Backing, WALL ST. J.,
Dec. 5, 1989. For a discussion of the efforts to characterize infertility as a disease, see Margarete
Sandelowski & Sheryl de Lacey, The Uses of a “Disease”: Infertility as a Rhetorical Vehicle, in
INFERTILITY AROUND THE GLOBE: NEW THINKING ON CHILDLESSNESS, GENDER, AND
REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES 33, 36–37 (Marcia C. Inhorn & Frank van Balen eds., 2002).
28. See, e.g., Neumann, supra note 27, at 1216–17 (reviewing studies).
29. See Amy Monahan, Federalism, Federal Regulation, or Free Market? An Examination of
Mandated Health Benefit Reform, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 1361, 1371. About eighty-five percent of
companies with more than 1000 employees self-insure, and, overall, self-insuring companies account for
half the workforce employed by companies offering health insurance. Christina H. Park, Prevalence of
Employer Self-Insured Health Benefits: National and State Variation, 57 MED. CARE RES. & REV. 340,
347 (2000).
30. See Monahan, supra note 9, at 48.
31. Neumann, supra note 27, at 1220.
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of mandates generally and question the distribution of their benefits.32
Mandating fertility-treatment coverage is a hard sell when so many people lack
any health insurance.33 Mandates also steer some intended parents toward
assisted reproduction who might otherwise have seriously considered
adoption.34 One scholar notes that “providing insurance for expensive fertility
treatments but not adoption (which can also cost thousands of dollars)
ironically makes these technologies the only alternative some people can
afford.”35 She and others posit that preventive care and promotion of general
health to reduce infertility ex ante could be a better use of funds.36
More fundamentally, mandatory coverage is controversial because of the
underlying services.37 Assisted reproduction has many supporters who frame it
as a component of reproductive freedom, but it also attracts objections from a
range of parties, including religious organizations and some feminists.38 In
addition, some fear these technologies will be used to select children with
particular traits.39 The live-birth rate from IVF and related procedures for some

32. Mandated coverage faces objections not specific to reproductive medicine. See Clark C.
Havighurst & Barak D. Richman, Distributive Injustice(s) in American Health Care, 69 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 7, 62 (Autumn 2006) (discussing the role of mandates in raising costs and mandates
as the product of special-interest lobbying “in an atmosphere of general consumer–voter disinterest”);
Barak D. Richman, Insurance Expansions: Do They Hurt Those They Try To Help?, 26 HEALTH AFF.
1345, 1348 (2007) (finding that mandated insurance coverage did not equalize the use of pharmaceutical
and mental-health services among vulnerable populations).
33. See Neumann, supra note 27, at 1218–19 (“An emotional debate has attended the issue of
health insurance coverage for IVF.”); Carson Strong, Too Many Twins, Triplets, Quadruplets, and So
On: A Call for New Priorities, 31 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 272, 276 (2003) (“Particularly relevant is the fact
that millions of people in the United States lack health insurance and do not qualify for Medicaid or
Medicare.”).
34. See BARTHOLET, supra note 12, at 211–12 (lamenting that the “significant IVF-related
regulatory move” has been coverage mandates rather than imposing stricter regulations on IVF).
35. ROBERTS, supra note 7, at 290; see also BARTHOLET, supra note 12, at 34–35 (describing how
society gives “preferred treatment to those who choose child production over child adoption”);
Neumann, supra note 27, at 1225–26, 1232 (“Any decision by health insurers regarding IVF has
implications for adoption.”). See generally Appleton, supra note 12, at 427, 428–31 (discussing barriers
to adoption that do not exist for reproductive medicine and the possibility that they affect demand).
36. See, e.g., ROBERTS, supra note 7, at 291 (“Research designed to reduce infertility, programs
that facilitate adoption, and the general provision of basic human needs are examples of expenditures
that would help a far broader range of people than IVF.”); Heitman, supra note 16, at 96–97
(conceptualizing infertility as a public-health problem).
37. Some of the controversy relates to the use of extra fertilized eggs that will not be discussed
here. See, e.g., Steven Goldberg, Technology Unbound: Will Funded Libertarianism Dominate the
Future?, 18 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 21, 27–28 (2007) (“To many Americans, a ‘spare embryo’ is a
human life. As a result, discarding an embryo is entirely unacceptable.”).
38. See, e.g., THOMPSON, supra note 5, at 56 (“Feminists are well placed to understand the special
burden that involuntary childlessness places on women, but they are ambivalent about supporting
women who seek infertility treatments because of the implicit support that this seems to lend to
conventional gender roles and gendered stratification.”); Lyria Bennett Moses, Understanding Legal
Responses to Technological Change: The Example of In Vitro Fertilization, 6 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH.
505, 522–23 (2005) (reviewing Catholic objections to IVF).
39. See Mary Crossley, Dimensions of Equality in Regulating Assisted Reproductive Technologies, 9
J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 273, 285 (2005) (discussing trait-selection practices); Goodwin, supra note 7,
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users is very low, and some clinics inflate claims of achievement to attract
customers.40 Social scientists have observed that, for some women, the failure to
reproduce after invasive and time-consuming treatments imposes trauma
independent of any original disappointment from fertility barriers.41 Due to
current practices in assisted reproduction, those who become pregnant have a
much greater likelihood of higher-order multiple births, which produce health
risks for the mother and children.42 Families may experience financial hardship
as a result, although neither the families nor their fertility clinics fully
internalize the very high costs of their resulting medical needs.43 Indeed,

at 31 (discussing the use of procedures to choose sex and features of children); King, supra note 6, at
285 (“The technology has been a godsend to couples with family histories of genetic disorders and
chromosomal mutations causing infertility. However, expanding its use to permit prospective parents to
select embryos based on a wide array of genetic characteristics presents substantial risks to individuals
involved in the procedure and to society as a whole.”).
40. See, e.g., Goodwin, supra note 7, at 22 (“Despite its popularity, ART is a gamble: there are no
guarantees of pregnancy (although some doctors make exaggerated claims that they can help 95% of
patients conceive).”); Neumann, supra note 27, at 1230 (“The concern has been compounded by the
fact that programs have used varying definitions of what constitutes a success: some programs have
defined a success as a “live birth,” while others have used a ‘pregnancy,’ whether or not the pregnancy
came to term.”); Noah, supra note 8, at 614 (describing “questions . . . about the accuracy of
promotional claims made by fertility clinics”); Strong, supra note 33, at 272 (describing “misleading
advertising by some infertility programs, particularly in regard to pregnancy success rates”).
41. See ROBERTS, supra note 7, at 248–49 (noting how “arduous” the IVF process is, “usually
followed by heartbreaking disappointment,” the physical and emotional trauma of which concerns
many feminists); Charis Cussins, Producing Reproduction: Techniques of Normalization and
Naturalization in Infertility Clinics, in REPRODUCING REPRODUCTION 66, 74 (Sarah Franklin &
Helena Ragoné eds., 1998) (“Infertility clinics expect infertility treatments to be stressful, and almost
all clinics have in-house psychologists to counsel patients (at an additional cost).”); Heitman, supra note
16, at 95 (discussing how disappointed expectations compound the trauma of fertility barriers);
Sandelowski & de Lacey, supra note 27, at 38 (reviewing research on the impact of failure at various
phases of treatment).
42. See, e.g., Hamilton & McManus, supra note 17, at 4 (calling multiple births “socially expensive
and dangerous”); Heitman, supra note 16, at 95 (“The growing use of infertility treatments nationwide
has been associated with a marked rise in the number of multiple-gestation pregnancies and an
attendant incidence of related complications and costs for mothers and babies.”); Moses, supra note 38,
at 583–84 (discussing the relationship between multiple birth and health risks); Neumann, supra note
27, at 1226 (discussing health risks to the mother); John Robertson, Procreative Liberty and Harm to
Offspring in Assisted Reproduction, 30 AM. J.L. & MED. 7, 10 (2004) (“The most serious health
problem posed by assisted reproduction is the high rate of multiple gestations.”); Strong, supra note 33,
at 272 (discussing multiple births and their consequences, and positing that the problem is that “too
much weight is given to the autonomy of infertile couples and not enough to the interests of the
children.”); see also Cussins, supra note 41, at 75 (“The rigors of repeated invasive techniques and
hormonal hyperstimulation on women, and the associated culture of perseverance, have been much
criticized in infertility medicine.”); King, supra note 6, at 308 (discussing health risks to the mother in
an unsuccessful pregnancy); Wilson, supra note 12, at 344–47 (discussing literature on the risks to
children born through IVF or ISCI). Some studies show a lower rate of multiple births when intended
parents have insurance coverage for assisted reproduction. See THOMPSON, supra note 5, at 4 tbl.1.1
(reviewing data); Strong, supra note 33, at 275 (“The study found that in the states with comprehensive
coverage there was a statistically significant decrease in the number of preembryos per transfer and the
multiple birth rate per transfer cycle.”).
43. See, e.g., Goodwin, supra note 7, at 3–4 (“Largely ignored are agency, financial incentives,
choice, and the health risks associated with the technology.”); Moses, supra note 38, at 584 (discussing
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scholarly articles are referring to assisted reproduction as gambling.44 Thus,
although some studies suggest that mandating insurance coverage of assisted
reproduction would impose relatively little cost, expansion of mandates is
neither inevitable nor universally supported.
Furthermore, it would be incorrect to assume that mandated, or otherwiseexpanded, insurance coverage resolves financial-access questions. By design,
insurance products normally do not cover all costs associated with a particular
service or treatment, and likely would not do so in this situation either.45 People
with private insurance coverage in particular incur significant out of pocket
expense, and sometimes more than the uninsured who avoid getting health
care.46 To the extent that insurance coverage incentivizes intended parents to
seek treatment in the first place, insurance expansions could expand rather than
diminish the demand for supplemental credit products.
C. Alternative Financing Approaches
Notwithstanding limits on tax subsidies and insurance coverage, some
intended parents do seek services on what many commentators have assumed is
a cash basis.47 Every year, thousands of people pay out of pocket for assisted
reproduction,48 and those considering adoption likewise need cash to prepare
and complete the transaction. Recognizing the potential to attract patients
without deep pockets or insurance, standalone companies and clinics have

the health problems and financial burdens of multiple births); Noah, supra note 8, at 619–24 (describing
the problems with multiple births, low birth weight, and prematurity).
44. See, e.g., Goodwin, supra note 7, at 22 (“Despite its popularity, ART is a gamble . . . .”);
Neumann, supra note 27, at 1219 (noting others who have referred to IVF use as gambling); David
Schmittlein & Donald Morrison, A Live Baby or Your Money Back: The Marketing of In Vitro
Fertilization Procedures, 49 MGMT. SCI. 1618, 1619 (2003) (referring to couples considering IVF as
“placing the largest-scale single [financial] gamble of their lives”).
45. Some mandate legislation prohibits higher cost-sharing for fertility treatments than for other
medical services, but does not prohibit cost-sharing altogether. See, e.g., Family Building Act of 2007,
H.R. 2892, 110th Cong. § 2707(c) (2007); S. Res. 759, 2007 Sess., at § 4 (N.C. 2007).
46. Jessica S. Banthin et al., The Financial Burden of Health Care 2001–2004, HEALTH AFF., Jan.
2008, at 188, 190 (reporting on the increase in financial burden from health care being driven by people
with private insurance).
47. See, e.g., Cussins, supra note 41, at 72 (reporting from clinic observation that “[i]f you are not
covered for the treatment and are not prepared verbally to attest that you can personally cover the
costs, no scheduling will occur. If you have been seen but have reneged on a payment, no subsequent
appointments will be made either.”); Judith F. Daar, Regulating Reproductive Technologies: Panacea or
Paper Tiger?, 34 HOUS. L. REV. 609, 661–62 (1997) (“[C]onsumers largely pay cash for services
rendered[;] . . . in most cases patients either pay cash or use credit cards for all services . . . .”); Noah,
supra note 8, at 607, 616 (referring to reproductive technology as being in a market in which most
patients pay out of pocket in full); Barton H. Hamilton & Brian McManus, Technology Diffusion and
Market Structure: Evidence from Infertility Treatment Markets 3, 8 (Sept. 2005) (unpublished article),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=813826 (describing how the fertility
market is a health-care market based on direct patient payments).
48. See Goodwin, supra note 7, at 50–51 (“Indeed, that thousands of infertile couples annually pay
out-of-pocket costs for assisted conception technologies further demonstrates the demand for such
services.”).
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offered money-back guarantees or package deals on multiple rounds of IVF.49
One academic study found that money-back-guarantee programs are not
profitable unless they channel younger and “less infertile” patients into IVF.50
Two national businesses engage in a robust trade of these arrangements. The
consumer-services division of IntegraMed, a publicly held company, sells a
program that refunds some money if IVF is unsuccessful.51 IntegraMed reports
that revenue from this program increased twenty-three percent in the first six
months of 2008 from the same period in 2007.52 Advanced Reproductive Care

49. See THOMPSON, supra note 5, at 63 tbl.2.1 (describing package deals and refund programs that
charge $27,000 for three rounds of IVF and refund $20,000 if the patient is not pregnant within a year);
id. at 237 (discussing flat-fee unlimited-service plans). The American Medical Association Code of
Medical Ethics generally discourages making fees contingent on the successful outcome of medical
treatment. See American Medical Association Code of Medical Ethics Opinion 6.01 (1994). For a
critique of that position, see David A. Hyman & Charles Silver, You Get What You Pay For: ResultBased Compensation for Health Care, 58 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1427 (2001).
50. See Schmittlein & Morrison, supra note 44, at 1618, 1632 (“Our analysis suggests that
guarantees . . . are made economically viable for clinics by pursuit of less-infertile couples who are in
the beginning stages of fertility assistance, rather than using IVF as a ‘last resort’ as had been the case
previously.”); id. at 1619 (“The guarantees are viable if new, relatively fertile couples are induced to
proceed directly to IVF instead of trying natural conception or less invasive procedures. For these
couples, on standard economic bases, these IVF ‘guarantees’ are not a good deal.”). See generally
Noah, supra note 8, at 613 (discussing whether some doctors start treating infertility too early). Cf. Lisa
Barrett Mann, A Baby, or Cash Back: Some IVF Centers Offer Risk-Sharing Deals, WASH. POST, May
18, 2004, at HE01 (reporting that encouraging earlier IVF increases the chances of success). But see
David A. Hyman & Charles Silver, supra note 49, at 1469 (critiquing Schmittlein and Morrison’s
interpretation of their results).
51. IntegraMed claims that one out of five IVF procedures in the United States is performed by an
associated fertility practice. Press Release, IntegraMed America, Inc., IntegraMed President & CEO
Jay Higham Named Ernst & Young Metro New York Entrepreneur of the Year 2008 Award Winner
(June 30, 2008), available at http://www.reuters.com/article/pressRelease/idUS95456+30-Jun-2008+BW
20080630. IntegraMed’s recent SEC filing describes two relevant divisions as follows:
Our Fertility Centers Division is comprised of a provider network of 10 contracted fertility
centers located in major markets across the United States. We offer products and services to
these providers designed to support the fertility centers’ growth. This division also supports a
Council of Physicians and Scientists, as well as ARTIC, a captive insurance company which
provides malpractice insurance to member physicians. Our Consumer Services Division offers
products directly to fertility patients. The division’s Shared Risk(R) Refund and financing
programs are designed to make the treatment process easier and more affordable for patients.
As of June 30, 2008, the division maintained a contracted network of 22 independent fertility
clinics under its Affiliate program which is designed to distribute the division’s products and
services to a wider group of patients than just those serviced by our Fertility Center locations.
The division also offers fertility medications directly to patients via a competitively priced
mail-order pharmacy.
IntegraMed, Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q), at 8 (June 30, 2008). See generally Greg Borzo, National
Networks Try to Attract Infertility Patients, OB/GYN NEWS, Feb. 15, 2001, at 1; Marilyn Case, Doctors
Begin Offering Creative Payment Plans for Fertility Treatment, WALL. ST. J., Sept. 8, 2000, at B1.
IntegraMed collects accounts receivable for the clinics in its network. See IntegraMed, Quarterly
Report (Form 10-Q), at 23 (June 30, 2008).
52. IntegraMed, Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q), at 18 (June 30, 2008). IntegraMed’s secondquarter profits in 2008 rose forty-six percent. See Market Watch, IntegraMed Q2 Revenue Grows 46%,
Drives 19% Rise in Net Income, http://www.reuters.com/article/pressRelease/idUS132468+31-Jul-2008
+BW20080731(last visited Sept. 18, 2008).
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(ARC), privately held and significantly doctor-owned, offers package deals on
IVF treatments and refund guarantees if no live birth results.53 Even if intended
parents participate in these programs, however, they still need money to pay.
Intended parents have employed a variety of creative methods for funding
assisted reproduction or adoption, including borrowing money from friends and
family,54 pulling money from savings and retirement accounts,55 pawning or
selling property,56 sharing prescription drugs,57 “donating” extra fertilized eggs to
obtain a discount on fertility services,58 participating in clinical trials,59 joining

53. ARC reports that its associated clinics represent thirty-five percent of the IVF market.
Advanced Reproductive Care, ARC’s Background, http://www.arcfertility.com/employers/back
grounder.html (last visited Sept. 18, 2008).
54. See, e.g., Ewing v. Ewing, No. 06-CA-148, 2007 WL 4563458, at *1 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 20,
2007) (using the mother’s money to partially finance fertility treatments); Robert J. Stillman, A 47Year-Old Woman with Fertility Problems Who Desires a Multiple Pregnancy, 297 J. AM. MED. ASS’N
858, 859 (2007) (“I did have an insurance carrier that covered my first couple of IVF treatments. But
after that, they’re not covering anything anymore. So I have had to, you know, get some money from
some of my relatives.”); Esther B. Fein, Calling Infertility a Disease, Couples Battle with Insurers, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 22, 1998, §1, at 1 (“If [couples with fertility problems] can, they usually then borrow from
relatives or friends.”); NAT’L ENDOWMENT FOR FIN. EDUC., HOW TO MAKE ADOPTION AN
AFFORDABLE OPTION 36–37, available at http://www.smartaboutmoney.org/nefe/uploadfiles/Adoption
Option.pdf [hereinafter NEFE] (listing relatives as a source of adoption financing).
55. See, e.g., Ewing, 2007 WL 4563458, at *16 (describing how funds for IVF were drawn from a
401(k) account, a life insurance policy, and a gift from the mother). The National Endowment for
Financial Education lists loans against retirement funds as a source of adoption cash, but also notes the
risks to long-term financial stability. NEFE, supra note 54, at 36–37; see also Mary Jo Feldstein,
Creative Financing Plans Aimed at Steep Infertility Treatment Costs, ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS (Minn.),
Sept. 3, 2006, at 7E [hereinafter Feldstein, Creative Financing Plans]; Mary Jo Feldstein, The Cost of
Conception, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Aug. 6, 2006, at A1 [hereinafter Feldstein, The Cost of
Conception] (discussing the use of savings to pay for $40,000 to $50,000 in fertility treatments).
56. See, e.g., Fein, supra note 54; In re Pisko, 364 B.R. 107, 110 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2007)
(adjudicating the case of a couple who sold their house and used $12,000 of the proceeds to pay for
Honduran adoption expenses rather than for delinquent federal taxes).
57. See, e.g., Fein, supra note 54 (describing a “drug cooperative for needy, infertile women from
the local Orthodox Jewish community”).
58. See Russell Korobkin, Buying and Selling Human Tissues for Stem Cell Research, 49 ARIZ. L.
REV. 45, 51 n.35, 54, 58 (2007) (discussing discounted fees for “oocyte sharing”); id. at 65 (noting that
the United Kingdom disallows payment for eggs but permits reduced-price treatments to egg donors);
see also BARTHOLET supra note 12, at 221 (“Patients in some programs pay for part of their treatment
by agreeing to surrender some of the eggs or embryos that they produce for use by others.”);
THOMPSON, supra note 5, at 257 (discussing example from Brazil); Appleton, supra note 12, at 422
(citing examples of “egg sharing” financing); June Carbone & Paige Gottheim, Markets, Subsidies,
Regulation, and Trust: Building Ethical Understandings into the Market for Fertility Services, 9 J.
GENDER RACE & JUST. 509, 515 (2005) (noting that obtaining additional unused eggs from women
undergoing IVF often involves “less inconvenience and expense” than purchasing them from other
donors); Roberts, supra note 17, at 941 (same); IntegraMed Fertility Network, Shared Risk for IVF
Treatment Plan—Boost success and control IVF costs, http://www.integramed.com/inmdweb/content/
cons/shared.jsp (last visited Sept. 18, 2008).
59. See Janet L. Dolgin, The Evolution of the “Patient”: Shifts in Attitudes About Consent, Genetic
Information, and Commercialization in Health Care, 34 HOFSTRA L. REV. 137, 176 (2005) (citing
Antonio Regalado, Clinical Trials Offer In-Vitro at a Discount, WALL ST. J., Jan. 13, 2004, at D1).
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the military,60 draining flexible medical-spending accounts,61 taking additional
jobs,62 and encouraging friends and family to shop via programs that dedicate
percentages of purchases to adoption accounts.63 People also move to states that
mandate coverage of their desired services or engage in overseas fertility
tourism.
Some methods of raising funds for assisted reproduction or adoption are
more extreme. In one case, a woman represented to her ex-fiancé that she
needed to use his credit card to finance $8700 for “surgery and therapy for a
life-threatening blood disorder,” and, once she had secured permission, used
the credit card instead for IVF.64 In another, a Colorado lawyer used funds
embezzled from his law firm to pay debts incurred for fertility treatments and
adoption fees.65
D. The Missing Link of Credit and Debt
In other contexts, scholars routinely discuss consumer credit as a method of
smoothing lifecycle consumption to overcome temporal mismatches between a
household’s financial means and various wants and needs.66 Surprisingly,
however, little systematic attention has been given to the role of formal credit—
and simple debt—in the parenthood market. A review of case law, scholarly
commentary, and the media reveals mostly anecdotal references to paying for

60. See, e.g., Child Welfare Information Gateway, Military Families and Adoption, http://www.
childwelfare.gov/pubs/f_milita.cfm (last visited June 24, 2008) (discussing the adoption subsidy for
military families).
61. See, e.g., Chen May Yee & Josephine Marcotty, Miracles for Sale: With Rising Competition,
Some IVF Clinics Are Offering Money-Back Guarantees and Going Farther Afield to Look for Patients,
MINN. STAR TRIB., Oct. 22, 2007 (reporting on one person who “cleaned out” FSA in addition to a
“medical loan”).
62. See, e.g., Feldstein, supra note 54 (discussing working extra shifts to finance fertility
treatments).
63. See, e.g., Buy For Charity, http://www.buyforcharity.com/ (last visited Sept. 18, 2008);
iGive.com, http://www.igive.com/welcome/ (last visited Sept. 18, 2008); One Cause, http://www.one
cause.com/ (last visited Sept. 18, 2008).
64. Colleen M. v. Fertility & Surgical Assocs. of Thousand Oaks, 132 Cal. App. 4th 1466, 1470 (Cal.
Dist. Ct. App. 2005).
65. Guyerson v. Colorado, 85 P.3d 1073, 1075 (Colo. 2004). Although later reinstated, Guyerson
originally was disbarred. See Colorado v. Guyerson, 898 P.2d 1062, 1064 (Colo. 1995).
66. See Douglas Baird, Technology, Information, and Bankruptcy, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 305, 310
(discussing the benefits of a constant standard of living over years of fluctuating income); see also ERIC
BELSKY & REN ESSENE, HARV. UNIV., JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUDIES, CONSUMER MORTGAGE
CREDIT AT A CROSSROADS: PRESERVING EXPANDED ACCESS WHILE INFORMING CHOICES AND
PROTECTING CONSUMERS (2008) (reviewing economic literature). According to the latest Survey of
Consumer Finance data, the percentage of households with any type of debt—the most prevalent of
which were home mortgages and installment loans (such as student and car loans)—reached 76.4 in
2004. BRIAN K. BUCKS, ARTHUR B. KENNICKELL & KEVIN B. MOORE, FED. RESERVE BD., RECENT
CHANGES IN U.S. FAMILY FINANCES: EVIDENCE FROM THE 2001 AND 2004 SURVEY OF CONSUMER
FINANCES A25–A30 (2006), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/oss/oss2/2004/bull0206.pdf.

07_JACOBY_BOOK PROOF.DOC

Summer 2009]

10/26/2009 1:58:51 PM

THE DEBT FINANCING OF PARENTHOOD

159

fertility treatments or adoption with home-equity loans,67 credit cards,68 or
general loans.69
Some people who incur debt to overcome fertility barriers can be found in
bankruptcy. In response to a general question about the source of the financial
trouble, one bankruptcy filer reported,
Our problems mainly stemmed from infertility. My husband [and] I both had two
surgeries and insurance covered very little. We have spent the last five years trying to
figure out why we couldn’t have a baby. I went through numerous procedures [and]
nothing worked. We got in over our heads because [it’s] something I wanted so badly.
We ended up finding out 2 m[on]ths after we first talked to the bankruptcy lawyer that
70
we we[re] pregnant.

Case law provides several other examples of debt intertwined with fertility
problems for bankruptcy filers. One financially troubled household used
Chapter 7 bankruptcy to discharge about $200,000 of unsecured claims, which
included debt for fertility treatments and adoption expenses running over $3600
per month.71 Another couple unsuccessfully proposed a three-year Chapter 13

67. See, e.g., Ewing v. Ewing, No. 06-CA-148, 2007 WL 4563458, at *6 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 20,
2007) (involving an intended parent using a home-equity line of credit to finance fertility treatments);
SPAR, supra note 1, at 4; Feldstein, Creative Financing Plans, supra note 55 (reporting on the use of
home-equity lines for fertility treatments); Feldstein, The Cost of Conception, supra note 55 (same);
Justin Martin, A Baby or Your Money Back: Dr. Geoffrey Sher’s Fertility Clinics Promise Results and
Deliver Profits. Some Rivals Find His Methods Unseemly. Others Imitate Them, FORTUNE, Nov. 10,
2003 (discussing how a couple used a second mortgage to pay for an “outcome-based” assistedreproduction plan); Laurence Zuckerman, Couple Now Has No Savings, More Debt and Little Hope of
Having a Baby, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 9, 1996, § 1, at 39 (reporting that $12,000 of a home-equity line of
credit was used for gamete intrafallopian transfer plus embryo preservation); Some Discover Hopes of
Family Lie with Insurer, AUGUSTA CHRON., Oct. 31, 2007, at A22 (reporting on the use of home-equity
loans before changes in insurance to cover $20,000 of IVF).
68. See, e.g., In re Pobiner, 309 B.R. 405, 413 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2004) (discussing a $1685-permonth credit-card obligation for fertility treatments); Daar, supra note 47, at 661–62 (describing how
“patients either pay cash or use credit cards for all services”); Fein, supra note 54; Martin, supra note 67
(discussing the use of credit cards to pay for an “outcome-based” plan); Liza Mundy, A Special Kind of
Poverty: The Poor Get Used to Going Without. But Going Without a Baby is Hard to Get Used To,
WASH. POST, Apr. 20, 2003, at W8; Zuckerman, supra note 67; Some Discover Hopes of Family Lie
with Insurer, supra note 67 (reporting how a woman used credit cards before her husband’s insurance
changed to cover $20,000 of IVF).
69. See, e.g., Goodwin, supra note 7, at 34 (referring to an IntegraMed advertisement for loan
terms); Gena Kittner, Special Place in Brooklyn for Family; The Klahn Family Is Preparing Their Home
for Four Siblings They Are Adopting from Russia to Join a Son Adopted Seven Years Ago, WIS. STATE
J., Apr. 1, 2001, at A1 (reporting that a family took a $65,000 loan to adopt children from Russia). To
supplement these observations, I combined other research paths with a review of the Web sites of
Spar’s list of top fertility clinics and representative adoption agencies, as well as those of IntegraMed
and ARC, for loan information. See SPAR, supra note 1, at 54 tbl.2–1 (listing the top twenty U.S. clinics
by number of IVF cycles performed in 2002); id. at 179 tbl.6–1, 184 tbl.6–2 (listing typical domestic and
international fees at adoption agencies). These observations are discussed in section III.
70. Case # W3-0938H, 2007 Consumer Bankruptcy Project (on file with author).
71. Pobiner, 309 B.R. at 413. This debtor sought to discharge student loans under 11 U.S.C. §
523(a)(8) (2000) and the judge denied the request. This was based in part on the judge’s assessment
that fertility and adoption expenses did not relate to maintaining a minimal standard of living, which is
part of the undue-hardship test. Id.
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payment plan in bankruptcy in which the filers proposed to spend over $800 per
month on fertility treatments.72
In summary, fulfilling goals of parenthood for those with fertility barriers
continues to come with a hefty price tag. When governmentally subsidized
approaches such as taxes or insurance are not comprehensive, the strong desire
for parenthood propels people of modest means into a range of coping
mechanisms from the mundane to the extreme. Given the central role consumer
credit plays in other major household expenditures, it makes sense to focus
more intently on the role of consumer debt in the parenthood market.
III
PARENTHOOD MARKET LOANS
Notably, although one can imagine a market for parenthood loans for both
adoption and assisted reproduction,73 today’s providers of specialty loan
products seem to be marketing their wares either to assisted-reproduction
customers or to adoption customers, but not to both. And once an intended
parent has gone to a fertility clinic, it is unlikely that she will be counseled on
adoption or adoption financing.74 Even a consultant report recommending that
credit unions make loans for both adoption and fertility treatments suggests
that borrowers will feel “more comfortable” if fertility loans are offered
through doctors’ offices.75 What this means, then, is that two distinct loan
markets have developed—one for each route to parenthood.

72. In re Bayless, 264 B.R. 719, 721 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1999). The court sustained American
Express’s objection to the proposed fertility expenditure, denied confirmation of the plan, and
dismissed the case:
The Court can find no reported cases on the question of elective or discretionary medical
treatments of any variety being funded through a Chapter 13 plan. This Court refuses to
approve a plan that requires unsecured creditors to subsidize fertility treatments. While
having children is a major life activity, it is not a necessary one, or one that cannot be
postponed. On the contrary, in the modern era, it is simply another lifestyle choice.
Id. at 721.
73. See MARK C. MEYER, FILENE RESEARCH INST., LIFESTYLE LENDING OFFERS INNOVATION
AND GROWTH FOR CREDIT UNIONS 6, 8 (2005) (proposing that credit unions make loans for both
adoption and fertility treatments).
74. According to Spar,
During the course of fertility treatment . . . doctors do not typically suggest alternatives to
their own form of treatment; they rarely advise their patients to contemplate adoption, foster
care, or living without children. Such options simply are not within the confines of their
profession: even though they are actually in the business of providing children for parents to
raise, they define their role as curing infertility.
SPAR, supra note 1, at 208–09; see also THOMPSON, supra note 5, at 95 (reporting on the sense among
women in treatment that there always was something new to try, making it very difficult to stop
treatment until a doctor declared options exhausted or finances lapsed); Neumann, supra note 27, at
1225 (talking about how doctors treat the desire for a child as a medical problem rather than as a social
problem that can be addressed in other ways).
75. MEYER, supra note 73, at 8.
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A. Loans for Assisted Reproduction
About a decade ago, a news story reported that fertility clinics that failed to
require full payment at the time of services had low collection rates thereafter.76
The Coker Group, a health-care consultant, advises in a report published by the
American Medical Association that doctors should protect their own financial
interests and should not extend credit to their patients.77 Some fertility providers
simply do not follow this advice and become creditors of their patients for many
thousands of dollars.78
Other parties intentionally offer fertility credit, with doctors and clinics
playing important roles in distribution. The most prominent lender appears to
be Capital One Fertility, which is part of Capital One Healthcare Finance,
which in turn is a subsidiary of Capital One Financial Corporation.79 Capital
One Fertility “offer[s] loans from $1,500 to $40,000, giving . . . a flexible range
of funds to help pay for fertility treatment options like Clomid, PCOS
treatment, IVF, IUI, ICSI, surgery, tubal ligation reversals, and donor eggs.”80
Capital One Fertility gets much support from other players in the assistedreproduction industry. Many Web sites of high-volume fertility clinics directly
or indirectly refer visitors to Capital One.81 ARC and IntegraMed, the sellers of
package deals and refund programs, also market Capital One Fertility to pay
for these package deals.82 According to IntegraMed, a Capital One Fertility loan
76. See Roxanne Nelson, Financing Infertility, CNN.com, May 19, 1999, http://www.cnn.com/
HEALTH/women/9905/19/financing.infertility/ (noting that clinics experienced low collection rates
when people were billed later—especially in the absence of a live birth).
77. See THE COKER GROUP, MAXIMIZING BILLING AND COLLECTIONS IN THE MEDICAL
PRACTICE 43 (Am. Med. Ass’n 2007); see also Rhonda L. Rundle & Paul Davies, Hospitals Start to
Seek Payment Upfront, WALL ST. J., June 2, 2004, at D1.
78. For an example of unpaid reproductive medical expenses of over $12,000 in a marriagedissolution case, see Darbelli v. Korbeh, No. FA044000730, 2005 WL 1219732, at *1–*2 (Conn. Super.
Ct. 2005) (allocating those expenses to the husband who sought divorce due to wife’s inability to bear
children). See also Jane Gross, The Fight to Cover Infertility; Suit Says Employer’s Refusal to Pay Is
Form of Bias, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 7, 1998, at B1 (reporting on a patient paying a few hundred dollars per
month on a debt of $10,000 to a fertility doctor who refuses to treat without payment ); cf. Cussins,
supra note 41, at 72.
79. See Company Report for Capital One Healthcare Finance, Osiris, Jul. 10, 2008 (on file with
Law and Contemporary Problems). The Healthcare Finance subsidiary reported operating revenue of
$30.3 million in 2006 but does not separately list fertility revenue. Id.
80. Capital One Fertility, http://www.capitalonehealthcarefinance.com/fertility/ (last visited Feb.
19, 2009)
81. Prominent clinics that link to or mention Capital One Fertility include Boston IVF, Highland
Park IVF Center, Shady Grove Reproductive Science Center, Cooper Center for In Vitro Fertilization,
Reproductive Biology Associates, Midwest Reproductive Medicine, Fertility Center of New England,
Inc., and the New England Clinic of Reproductive Medicine. The Center for Advanced Reproductive
Services at the University of Connecticut offers low-interest loans of up to $25,000 that appear to be
funded by Capital One Fertility. The Center for Advanced Reproductive Services, Financial
Counseling, http://www.uconnfertility.com/programs_patient.htm (last visited Sept. 18, 2008).
82. ARC features an “affordable monthly payment plan” that is a Capital One Fertility loan. ARC
Affordable
Payment
Plan,
http://www.arcfertility.com/family_building/financial_services.html.
IntegraMed offers “infertility financing” that is administered and offered by Capital One (last visited
Feb. 19, 2009); see also IntegraMed, Infertility Financing—Apply for a Loan Now, http://www.integra
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is available to people with a gross annual income of as little as $15,000.83
Doctors must have a relationship with Capital One Fertility for their patients to
use the credit at the clinic.84 As of 2006, Capital One Fertility had a nationwide
network of 30,000 doctors who paid to participate in the program.85 Some
doctors even have loan kiosks in their offices to facilitate the process.86 Capital
One Fertility holds out the potential of loan approval “in minutes.”87
Capital One Fertility loans are closed-end credit with fixed interest rates.
The payment calculator on Capital One’s Web site shows a range of pricing for
$20,000 and $40,000 loans.
To borrow $20,000:
Repayment Term

Monthly Payments

APR

84 Months

$344–$525

10.99%–25.99%

36 Months

$610–$815

5.99%–25.99%

18 Months

$1130–$1369

1.99%–25.99%

Repayment Term

Monthly Payments

APR

84 Months

$688–$1050

10.99%–25.99%

36 Months

$1220–$1629

5.99%–25.99%

18 Months

$2260–$2737

1.99%–25.99%

To borrow $40,000:

Figure 1: Examples of Capital One Fertility Loan Pricing88
If the forty-two-year-old patient from the introduction to this article were to
repay her $20,000 loan over eighty-four months, she would pay $44,100 in total.
This figure excludes fees, charges, and any increased rates that might be
imposed if she paid late and does not capture repeated attempts at treatment
beyond the scope of the first loan. The cost would match some of the priciest
adoptions—except that her odds of ending up with a child would be lower.89 If
medfertility.com/inmdweb/content/cons/financingpartners.jsp (last visited Feb. 19, 2009); Goodwin,
supra note 7, at 34 (reporting on how the IntegraMed Web site encourages people to finance fertility
treatments with loans).
83. IntegraMed Fertility Network, Finance—Application Form, https://integramed.feeplan.com/
form.asp?Plan=FFP&currPage=0 (last visited Sept. 18, 2008); see also Kathleen Kerr, Boom in the Baby
Business, NEWSDAY, Oct. 18, 2007, at A42 (discussing loan terms).
84. Capital One’s Web site lists doctors by geography. See Capital One Healthcare Finance, Find A
Doctor, http://www.capitalonehealthcarefinance.com/fertility/find.asp (last visited Sept. 18, 2008).
85. Feldstein, The Cost of Conception, supra note 55.
86. Id.
87. Feldstein, Creative Financing Plans, supra note 55; Capital One HealthCare Finance, Fertility,
http://www.capitalonehealthcarefinance.com/ fertility/ (last visited Sept. 18, 2008).
88. Capital One HealthCare Finance, Fertility, supra note 87.
89. See Neumann, supra note 27, at 1226 (comparing costs based on the likelihood of becoming a
parent through adoption and IVF).
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she repays the debt in eighteen months instead, her total debt would be
$24,642.
Capital One Fertility is not alone in soliciting assisted-reproduction
customers for credit products. CareCredit, part of GE Money Bank, specifically
advertises credit for fertility treatments as well as for services like weight loss,
chiropractic treatment, and hair restoration.90 The joining of credit products for
fertility treatments among other such services reinforces one line of perception
that many advocates of fertility-insurance mandates strenuously oppose—that
such assisted reproduction is a “luxury” rather than a medical need.91
Other lenders agree to serve customers of particular fertility-service
providers. The Institute for Reproductive Medicine and Science of Saint
Barnabas sends patients to Wachovia Bank or PFS Patient Financing.92 The
Home National Bank has a program with The World Egg Bank “to bring
unprecedented affordability to frozen donor eggs to our recipients” through
loans at “affordable interest rates” available through “easy online application
and approval.”93 The World Egg Bank’s fee schedule anticipates that intended
parents make bulk purchases of eggs (at least 5 or 6); thus, if 100 percent
financed, the principal on the loans could hover around $15,000 or $20,000 for
eggs alone.94 Because The World Egg Bank lists surrogacy prices on its fee
schedule, it is possible that loans could be extended to such services as well,
although the Web site does not explicitly note this. At one time, Citibank was
reported to have an arrangement with a clinic in Brooklyn, New York.95

90. At least one sperm bank uses the CareCredit payment plan. Rene Almeling, Selling Genes,
Selling Gender: Egg Agencies, Sperm Banks, and the Medical Market in Genetic Material, 72 AM. SOC.
REV. 319, 333 (2007); see, e.g., CareCredit, The Choice Is Yours, http:// www.carecredit.com/other/
whycc.html (last visited Sept. 18, 2008); see also PFS Patient Financing Home Page, http://www.p-f-s.
com/ (last visited Sept. 18, 2008); PFS Patient Financing, What We Do, http://www.p-f-s.com/consumer/
(last visited Sept. 18, 2008) (noted by some fertility clinics as providing loans, but on the Web site also
advertising loans for “liposuction, hair restoration, and facelifts, as well as cosmetic and implant, and
orthodontic dentistry, laser vision correction, dermatology, orthotics and prosthetics, home health
equipment, bariatric treatments, behavioral medicine”).
91. See MEYER, supra note 73 (discussing fertility lending as part of a lifestyle lending portfolio);
SPAR, supra note 1, at 217–24 (spelling out several alternative models, including the luxury model, for
the regulation of the baby business); In re Bayless, 264 B.R. 719, 721 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1999)
(referring to the use of assisted reproduction as a “lifestyle choice”).
92. The Institute for Reproductive Medicine and Science of Saint Barnabas, Financial Information,
http://www.sbivf.com/financial_information.htm (last visited Sept. 18, 2008). Like some other financiers,
PFS’s business is not limited to fertility customers. See PFS Patient Financing Home Page, supra note
90.
93. The World Egg Bank, Recipient’s Finance Option, http://www.theworldeggbank.com/The%20
World%20Egg%20Bank/Recipients/egg-recipient-finance.aspx (last visited Mar. 26, 2009). The
program is available to U.S. residents only. Id.
94. The World Egg Bank, Fee Schedule, http://www.theworldeggbank.com/The%20World%20
Egg%20Bank/Recipients/egg-recipient-fee-schedule.aspx (last visited Mar. 26, 2009).
95. See Fein, supra note 54 (reporting on the relationship). “Brooklyn IVF” may now be “Genesis
Fertility & Reproduction Medicine,” a member of IntegraMed. See Amy Waldman, For Childless
Orthodox Jews, Fertility Treatment Is No Simple Solution, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 10, 1997, § 13, at 8
(describing Dr. Richard V. Grazi as the “director of Brooklyn IVF, an infertility clinic”); Genesis
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Another clinic advertises that loans with up to a five-year repayment schedule
are available through a local bank’s arrangement with a hospital,96 or refers
patients to MedChoice Financial.97 For surgical procedures related to fertility,
that clinic also offers a “24 Month Prepayment” plan under which, as the name
suggests, the debtor prepays for the operation over two years—a service
layaway plan that flips the debtor–creditor relationship.98
The fertility loan is not exclusively a U.S. innovation. Indeed, the First
National Bank, in Lebanon, claims to have been the pioneer of specialty loans
for fertility treatments after experiencing success with plastic-surgery loans.99
This bank offers online applications and “quick approval” for revolving loans to
cover fertility and delivery costs, baby accessories, plus stem-cell collection and
preservation cost, repayable over periods of up to thirty-six months.100 The loans
cannot exceed certain (significant) portions of a borrower’s monthly income.101
Borrowers should not be over the age of sixty-four when the term of the loan
ends.102 According to a news account, a bank representative claimed to receive
200 to 250 calls per day from potential customers after the bank advertised the
loans on billboards.103
B. Loans for Adoption
The adoption loan market is similar to the assisted-reproduction loan
market in that for-profit financial institutions also make adoption-specific loans.

Fertility & Reproduction Medicine, Meet Our Team, http://genesisfertility.com/index.html (last visited
Sept. 11, 2008) (including Dr. Grazi).
96. This clinic notes this financing in connection with two “unlimited service” plans: The
FertileCare Gold Plan (Two Years) and the Preferred Plan (One Year). Babies by Levin, FertileCare
Physician Service Agreement, http://www.babies-by-levin.com/psc_3.htm (last visited Sept. 18, 2008)
(advertising a flat fee for unlimited services for one or two years). The Web site says the alternative is
to “pay as you go” and “take your chances with your insurance.” Id. For patients who purchase tubalreversal surgery, this provider also offers free fertility treatments. Babies by Levin, Reversal Pricing,
http://www.babies-by-levin.com/rev_10.htm (last visited Sept. 18, 2008).
97. Babies by Levin, Payment Options, http://www.babies-by-levin.com/finance.htm (last visited
Feb. 19, 2009).
98. A patient pays twenty-four monthly installments of $291.67 for an in-patient procedure or
$258.33 for an out-patient procedure. Id. Higher-weight patients may have to pay more. Babies by
Levin, Weight Table, http://www.babies-by-levin.com/prepay24.htm (last visited Sept. 12, 2008). This
provider also offers a “Fast-Track” program for patients who want tubal-ligation reversal quickly.
Babies by Levin, Tubal Reversal—Fast-Track, http://www.babies-by-levin.com/fast_track.htm (last
visited Sept. 11, 2008). A nonrefundable half of the cost must be paid to lock in the date. Id. The
balance is due one week before the procedure. Id. “If the balance of the fee is not paid at that time and
in that fashion then the procedure will be cancelled and will not be rescheduled.” Id.
99. First National Bank, Fertility Loan “The First of Its Kind,” http://www.fnb.com.lb/template.
asp?id=170 (last visited Mar. 26, 2009).
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Hayeon Lee, A Fertile Market: A Controversial New Loan Helps Lebanese Couples Conceive,
NOW LEBANON, Aug. 25, 2008, available at http://www.nowlebanon.com/NewsArticleDetails.aspx?ID=
56159.
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But on the adoption side, nonprofit foundations are more heavily involved in
financing as well, and some pursue nonpecuniary social objectives instead of
high-interest payments and fees.
Major adoption organizations have forged partnerships with financial
institutions to offer secured and unsecured credit to help intended parents
defray adoption costs. The National Council for Adoption (NCA) and Bank of
America established a program for an adoption line of credit of up to $25,000,
with repayment terms from twenty-four to eighty-four months.104 The National
Adoption Foundation (NAF) and Bank of America also offer unsecured loan
products: the National Adoption Foundation Visa Platinum Card,105 and a
GoldOption Flexible Line of Credit of up to $25,000.106 In advertising this loan,
NAF states,
The National Adoption Foundation offers an unsecured loan program that gives
families, whether renters or owners, an additional source of needed funds without
pledging their homes or other forms of collateral. This program has proved
enormously helpful, with very high approval rates. Over four thousand families have
107
accomplished their dream through the NAF.

Prominent adoption agencies and foundations spread the word about the
Bank of America loans.108
Like fertility clinics, adoption agencies have developed direct connections to
financial institutions for loans. For example, Families Thru International
Adoption reports that Old National Bank will offer loans to its clients in five
states, and Fifth Third Bank will do the same in seven states.109 Maps Adoption
and Humanitarian Aid says Key Bank will provide adoption loans to intended
parents at “very competitive rates.”110 Maps Adoption also recommends
checking with local banks and credit unions for home-equity loans.111 Another
tells potential parents that some banks offer “special rates and incentives” for

104. National Council for Adoption, Financing Your Adoption, https://www.adoptioncouncil.org/
resources/fianance_adoption.html (last visited Sept. 18, 2008).
105. National Adoption Foundation, Apply for a Card, http://www.nafadopt.org/NAF-credit-card/
NAF-credit-card.shtml (last visited Sept. 18, 2008).
106. Id.; Bank of America, GoldOption Flexible Line of Credit, http://www.fialoans.com/Gold
Option/NationalAdoption/ (last visited Sept. 18, 2008).
107. National Adoption Foundation, Apply for a Card, supra note 105.
108. See, e.g., Dave Thomas Foundation for Adoption, Adoption Resources, http://www.dave
thomasfoundation.org/Adoption-Resources/Adoption-Links#CMSNestedLinks_Id4 (linking to Bank of
America)Wide Horizons for Children, Adoption ABC’s: General Adoption Funding Sources, http://
www.whfc.org/basics/FundingResources.htm (last visited Sept. 18, 2008) (linking to the National
Adoption Foundation and the National Council for Adoption’s loan programs with consumer-credit
providers).
109. Families Thru International Adoption, Grant and Loan Resources, http://www.ftia.org/grants
loans.asp (last visited Sept. 18, 2008). The Web site did not list terms.
110. Maps Adoption and Humanitarian Aid, Financial Aid for Adoption, http://www.mapsadopt.
org/adoption/financialaid.html (last visited Sept. 18, 2008).
111. Id.
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adoption loans.112 The funding for adoption loans from other organizations is
not obviously from financial institutions. So, for example, Oxford Adoption
Foundation, Inc., offers international adoption loans for up to $5000, with
escalating interest over the nine-year repayment period.113
Although some loans, such as those from Bank of America, are unsecured,
others require collateral. The family home is likely to be the pledged asset,
meaning that the home could be lost to foreclosure if the parents default on the
adoption debt.114 For example, although some of the promotional material Web
pages are no longer active, until very recently, JP Morgan Chase Bank had an
arrangement with the Dave Thomas Foundation for Adoption to offer the
Chase “New Additions” home-equity line of credit. The Dave Thomas
Foundation is dedicated to increasing adoption out of the U.S. foster-care
system, but it is not clear whether the line of credit shared that limit.115 The
Chase New Additions line of credit had a one-percent teaser rate for the first
six months and came with a payment card that could be used to access the line
of credit.116 Through this program, an applicant could get a large enough loan—
in the hundreds of thousands of dollars—to pay off higher-priority mortgages,
giving Chase a first-priority position.117
Other entities that make adoption loans may condition approval on factors
not directly related to the ability to repay. Some loans are available only for the
adoption of children who are less in demand or more expensive to raise.118 For
112. American Adoptions, Financial Resources, http://www.americanadoptions.com/adopt/cost_
resources#adoption (last visited Sept. 18, 2008); see also Jeanie Wyatt, More than Money: Adoption
Requires Financial Juggling, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS, Dec. 18, 2006, at 1E (recommending that
potential users investigate loans carefully).
113. The interest rate on a nine-year loan is 0% for three years, 3% for three years, and 6% for
three years. Oxford Adoption Foundation, Inc., Application Process, http://www.oxfordadoption.com/
application.htm (last visited Sept. 18, 2008); Oxford Adoption Foundation, Inc., Promissory Note,
http://www.oxfordadoption.com/promissory.pdf (last visited Sept. 18, 2008). In addition to basic
financial information, the application requires a letter of introduction that includes family information,
reasons for adopting, and reasons for seeking a low-interest loan.
114. I’ve found none that contemplate reproductive materials or babies as collateral, as scholars
sometimes imagine. See Kevin H. Smith, Security Interests in Human Materials, 28 HOFSTRA L. REV.
127, 131 (1999) (hypothesizing human eggs as collateral and the steps needed for secured creditors to
take possession under Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code).
115. Dave Thomas Foundation for Adoption: Finding Forever Families for Children in Foster Care,
http://www.davethomasfoundation.org (last visited Feb. 19, 2009). This foundation pledges not to
discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation, marital status, or other such criteria. Id.
116. Chase, Chase New Additions (on file with Law and Contemporary Problems).
117. See Chase, Chase Home Equity Loan Application, http://www.chase.com/ccpmweb/home_
equity/document/heapplication.pdf (last visited Sept. 18, 2008).
118. For current gaps in supply and demand of children for adoption, see Erwin A. Blackstone et al.,
Market Segmentation in Child Adoption, 28 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 220, 220 (2008) (observing a
mismatch between supply and demand and proposing that surpluses from adoptions of healthy white
babies be used to subsidize adoptions of children less in demand); Krawiec, supra note 11, at 60
(“Perhaps, in the absence of a sufficient number of healthy, white infants, prospective parents would be
forced into the only sector of the baby trade that, sadly, does not suffer from a shortage of supply—the
state-run foster care system, through which a disproportionate number of older, minority, and special
needs children are available.”).
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example, one agency offers loans of up to about $5000 for adopting children
from China who are older or have special needs.119 Another makes loans of up
to $4500, repayable over three years, to those who adopt through the agency’s
African American Infant Program or who adopt children with special needs.120
A third offers loans for up to $4000 for adopting children currently placed in
foster care.121
Availability of adoption loans sometimes depends on intended-parent
characteristics and on the observance of traditional family structures. These
loans replicate filtering based on parental characteristics that takes place earlier
in the adoption process.122 Applications often ask for “family name” and
information about the “mother” and the “father,”123 or “male applicant” and
“female applicant,” even if marriage is not a loan requirement per se.124 Other
organizations offer adoption loans (or grants) only to observant Christians.125 To
get a loan from one such fund, applicants must be married, and the fund prefers
that the mother not work outside the home.126 The loan application queries the
borrower about church involvement, spiritual testimony, and what the potential
parents intend for their children to learn regarding issues such as creation and
119. China Care, Financial Aid for American Adopting Families, http://www.chinacare.org/CHIN06
5FinAidApp4.pdf (last visited Sept. 18, 2008).
120. World Association for Children and Parents, Financial Assistance, http://www.wacap.org/
FinancialAssistance.asp (last visited Sept. 18, 2008).
121. Arkansas Adopt Today, U.S. Waiting Child Fund, http://www.arkansasadopttoday.org/USW
CF.htm (last visited Sept. 18, 2008).
122. See BARTHOLET supra note 12, at 33–34 (describing the “parental screening” process used by
adoption agencies). For race discrimination in the parenthood market, see, for example, ROBERTS,
supra note 7, at 246–93; Goodwin, supra note 13, at 70–71.
123. China Care, Adoption Financial Assistance, http://www.chinacare.org/CHIN065FinAidApp4.
pdf (last visited Sept. 18, 2008); Oxford Adoption Foundation, Inc., Application Process, http://www.
oxfordadoption.com/application.htm (last visited Sept. 18, 2008) (referring to “mother applicant” and
“father applicant”).
124. A Child Waits Foundation, Borrowers Consent Form, http://www.achildwaits.org/forms/
consentform.htm (last visited Sept. 18, 2008); A Child Waits Foundation, Low Interest Loan Program
Questions and Answers, http://www.achildwaits.org/Foundationinfo.htm (last visited Sept.18, 2008).
125. See, e.g., The ABBA Fund, FAQ, http://www.abbafund.org/faq.html (last visited Sept. 18,
2008); see also God’s Grace Adoption Ministry, Application for Financial Aid, http://www.ggam.org/
main.html (last visited Sept. 27, 2008) (offering grants between $1000 and $4000 to married couples
with incomes of $60,000 or less to put toward international adoption, reporting an average grant of
$2000, and asking applicants to give their Christian testimony); Life International, Adoption Grant and
Loan Application, http://www.lifeintl.org/images/downloads/Application.pdf (last visited Sept. 27, 2008)
(asking for a “personal statement of faith” as part of the grant application); Lifesong for Orphans,
Adoption Grants and Loans, http://www.lifesongfororphans.org/images/downloads/GrantsLoansInfo.
pdf (last visited Sept. 18, 2008) (discussing matching grants, interest-free loans, and fundraising
support); Lifesong for Orphans, Loan FAQ, http://www.lifesongfororphans.org/images/downloads/
LoanGrantFAQ.pdf (last visited Sept. 18, 2008) (“The couple agrees to exercise financial stewardship
responsibility to both LifeSong and to God, to use funds that God provides to them to reimburse
LifeSong for the financial assistance that God graciously provided.”).
126. The ABBA Fund, supra note 125. The application requests information about the “adopting
father” and “adopting mother” and the adopting mother’s maiden name. The ABBA Fund,
Application for Adoption Financial Assistance, http://www.abbafund.org/applicationforassistance.pdf
(last visited Sept. 18, 2008).
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redemption.127 Some of these loan applications ask whether the applicants
already have biological children.128 Another organization provides interest-free
loans for adoption of up to $10,000, repayable over two to five years, but only to
Jewish residents of Northern California.129 Moreover, borrowers need not be
married, a policy reflected on the organization’s Web site featuring a single
woman who adopted her daughter from Russia.130
Foundations or agencies might also screen borrowers for what might be
described as desperation. For example, A Child Waits Foundation offers a lowinterest loan program for international adoptions. These loans can be extended
for up to $10,000 or fifty percent of adoption expenses, repayable at fivepercent interest over five years.131 However, loan approval also seems to be
conditioned on the following:
Before potential adoptive families apply to the foundation, they should first try to
obtain funds from other sources such as friends, relatives and home equity loans. Our
loans are not a low cost alternative to other financing options; rather they are a last
means of financing for families who have already exhausted all other possibilities and
132
funds.

IV
DISCUSSION
The idea of a commercial market for parenthood inevitably touches a
variety of “societal nerves.”133 Yet the establishment of industry-specific loan

127. The ABBA Fund, Application for Adoption Financial Assistance, supra note 126. Another
application inquires about the applicant’s definition of “eternal salvation” and similar concepts.
Lifesong for Orphans, Adoption Grant and Loan Application, supra note 125. Life International’s
application for international adoption includes a religious statement that, among other things, asks
applicants to describe their daily walk with God, to share salvation testimonies, and asks how God has
led the applicant to adopt. Life International, supra note 125.
128. Id.
129. Hebrew Free Loan, Home Page, http://www.hflasf.org/ (last visited Sept. 18, 2008); Hebrew
Free Loan, Overview of Our Loan Program, http://www.hflasf.org/loanoverview.html (last visited Sept.
18, 2008); Hebrew Free Loan, Types of Loans Available, http://www.hflasf.org/loantypes.html (last
visited Sept. 18, 2008). Applicants need third parties to co-sign or pledge collateral. Hebrew Free Loan,
How to Apply for an HFLA Loan, http://www.hflasf.org/loanapply.html (last visited Sept. 18, 2008).
130. See Hebrew Free Loan, Client Success Stories, http://www.hflasf.org/clientstories.html#suzanne
(last visited Sept. 18, 2008) (explaining how a mother used her loan to adopt a girl from a Moscow
orphanage).
131. A Child Waits Foundation, Low Interest Loan Program Application Process,
http://www.achildwaits.org/howtoapply.htm (last visited Sept. 18, 2008) (emphasis added). There is no
prepayment penalty. See id. This loan requires automatic withdrawal from bank accounts for
repayment. See id. If the loan defaults, the borrowers are responsible for one third of collection costs
and the foundation’s attorneys’ fees. Id. Late payments have late charges of ten percent. Id. Like other
organizations, A Child Waits may request to use the child’s picture and story but consent to this does
not affect loan determination. Id.
132. Id.
133. Kimberly D. Krawiec, Sunny Samaritans and Egomaniacs: Price Fixing in the Gamete Market,
72 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 59, 61 (Summer 2009). See generally Philip E. Tetlock, Coping with
Trade-Offs: Psychological Constraints and Political Implications, in ELEMENTS OF REASON:
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products reinforces the fundamental descriptive claim that this market is in full
swing.134 This section explores implications relating particularly to assisted
reproduction, leaving some of the adoption loan issues for future investigation.
The prospect of a fruitful collaboration between lenders and assistedreproduction service providers across the country suggests that the consumer
credit industry should be incorporated into political-economy accounts of the
parenthood market. Consumer lenders are powerful political actors.135 If they
become repeat players in the baby business, they join the ranks of parties who
shape this trade.136
Lender involvement might indirectly fuel some calls for regulation.
Commentators traditionally have referred to assisted reproduction as serving a
largely “elite” clientele.137 Providers of fertility services and money-back

COGNITION, CHOICE, AND THE BOUNDS OF RATIONALITY 253 (Arthur Lupia et al. eds., 2000)
(discussing fears of taboo trades, such as baby auctions).
134. See SPAR, supra note 1, at xv, 3, 101, 207(describing the growth of the baby industry despite
popular protests); Appleton, supra note 12, at 421; Margaret F. Brinig, The Effect of Transaction Costs
on the Market for Babies, 18 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 553, 554 (1994) (“The truth is that an adoption
market already exists, however distasteful that may seem.”); Dolgin, supra note 59, at 157, 175–80
(describing the business of infertility treatment); Richard A. Epstein, Surrogacy: The Case for Full
Contractual Enforcement, 81 VA. L. REV. 2305, 2332 (1995) (referring to a “gray market (where fees go
to the brokers, lawyers, and doctors who handle these transactions, and to the (inflated) medical
expenses of the mother)”); Ertman, supra note 6, at 15 (discussing the costs of alternative insemination
procedures); Goodwin, supra note 7, at 17 (describing “an incredibly active infertility marketplace”);
Goodwin, supra note 13, at 64–66 (describing “evidence of a de facto, largely unregulated, adoption free
market”); Krawiec, supra note 11 (“Throughout the world, in fact, baby selling is formally prohibited.
And throughout the world babies are bought and sold each day.”); Julia D. Mahoney, The Market for
Human Tissue, 86 VA. L. REV. 163, 165 (2000) (explaining “a marked and widespread unwillingness to
acknowledge the essential role of commerce in the distribution and allocation of human biological
materials”); Richard A. Posner, The Regulation of the Market in Adoptions, 67 B.U. L. REV. 59, 60
(1987) (discussing misconceptions about the “efficiency” of exchanging money for babies); Elizabeth J.
Samuels, Time to Decide? The Laws Governing Mothers’ Consents to the Adoption of Their Newborn
Infants, 72 TENN. L. REV. 509, 519 (2005) (“The market features and the role of money in infant
adoption raise ethical questions related to the decisionmaking of mothers.”); Carol Sanger, Developing
Markets in Baby-Making: In the Matter of Baby M, 30 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 67, 71 (2007) (discussing
“the economic framework of a developing market”); Debora L. Spar, For Love and Money: The
Political Economy of Commercial Surrogacy, 12 REV. INT’L POL. ECON. 287, 289, 304–05 (2005)
(discussing surrogacy as a commercial arrangement).
135. For the industry’s power in bankruptcy-law debates in public and behind the scenes, see, for
example, Melissa B. Jacoby, Negotiating Bankruptcy Legislation Through the News Media, 41 HOUS. L.
REV. 1091 (2004); Victoria A. Nourse & Jane Schacter, The Politics of Legislative Drafting: A
Congressional Case Study, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 575 (2002).
136. See, e.g., Pamela D. Bridgewater, Reconstructing Rationality: Towards a Critical Economic
Theory of Reproduction, 56 EMORY L.J. 1215, 1224 (2007) (listing parties who shape the baby business
in the absence of government regulation).
137. See Schmidt, supra note 25, at 444 (reporting on the characteristics of those who receive
fertility treatments); see also Cussins, supra note 41, at 73 (discussing a split among fertility
professionals as to whether an elite clientele was an aspiration or a problem); Crossley, supra note 39,
at 278 (discussing how disparate finances and the lack of insurance produces unequal access to assisted
reproduction). See generally ROBERTS, supra note 7, at 247–64 (discussing the privileged lifestyle that
IVF or similar procedures require).
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guarantees want a broader customer base.138 To achieve this expansion, they
must move beyond the elite to those of more-modest means. Specialty
consumer credit could be a key ingredient to this expansion, particularly when
partnered with other financial products such as money-back guarantees. Clinics
stand to gain by promoting consumer-credit arrangements even if they do not
originate the loan or profit directly from the credit extension.139 If fertility credit
expands access for people of modest means as predicted, tensions in assisted
reproduction could be magnified. For example, some “successful” parents may
have difficulty managing the financial consequences that result from, say, twins,
triplets, or more after being implanted with multiple embryos. This in turn
could increase the pressure to regulate doctors’ implantation practices with
greater rigor.
In addition to the consequences that arise from facilitating broader access,
lenders’ preferences could impact the market in a variety of ways. To provoke
future work on this question, I close by briefly offering three examples.
First, repeat-playing lenders arguably have a financial stake in the debate
over compensation to women who supply “donor” eggs. Particularly in the
absence of a unified loan market that includes adoption, lenders might benefit if
the egg trade were opened to market forces, although it is possible that the
status quo of functionally capped prices would better serve their interests.140

138. See generally Martin, supra note 67 (discussing Sher’s “embrace of information technology”
and Internet outreach); Gina Kolata, Fertility Inc.: Clinics Race to Lure Clients, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 1,
2002 (reporting on fertility specialists trying to attract attention through their Web sites and noting
“[s]ince most patients pay with their own money, in cash, and cash-paying patients can pretty much pick
and choose where they go, fertility specialists say that if they want to survive, they have to get the
attention of both patients and referring doctors”); Yee & Marcotty, supra note 61 (discussing how
“pursuers” of fertility treatments “have become the pursued,” and discussing how industry is “thriving”
on the Internet, in part through featuring services and special deals on Web sites); Hamilton &
McManus, supra note 47 (studying early movers offering new reproductive technology and comparing
their impact in competitive markets and monopoly markets); id. at 25 (recommending future study on
how firms differentiate themselves); see also THOMPSON, supra note 5, at 88 (describing how the supply
of infertility procedures started to “outstrip demand” in some places); Sandelowski & de Lacey, supra
note 27, at 41 (discussing various models of infertility and how consumer models underemphasize
efforts of the fertility industry to create products to sell); Fred Scaglione, Conceiving Profits in Fertility
Medicine, EQUITIES, Spring 2006, at 10 (citing IntegraMed’s president predicting that the fertility
market could grow four-fold).
139. In some medical-credit models, lenders have recourse against medical providers if their
patients do not pay. See Melissa B. Jacoby & Elizabeth Warren, Beyond Hospital Misbehavior: An
Alternative Account of Medical-Related Financial Distress, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 535, 559 (2006)
(discussing various medical-credit relationships and role of medical-credit providers in medical
providers’ accounts-receivable management). For problems with the commercialization of the patient
provider relationship, see generally Mark A. Hall & Carl E. Schneider, Patients as Consumers: Courts,
Contracts, and the New Medical Marketplace, 106 MICH. L. REV. 643 (2007).
140. See Krawiec, supra note 11, at 57–58 (noting “inefficiently low supply, high consumer prices,
and distributional disparities stemming from the distorted division of profits”); Krawiec, supra note
133, at 82 (explaining that, in an oligopsony, “consumers of fertility services are deprived of the full
range and number of eggs that would be available to them in a free market”); id. at 65–66 (observing
minimal egg donation in nations that have banned compensation); Mahoney, supra note 134, at 188.
For similar discussions about organs, see Michele Goodwin, The Body Market: Race Politics & Private
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Capital One Fertility specifically contemplates that and advertises that intended
parents can borrow money for “donor eggs.”141 The Home National Bank
likewise contemplates loaning for egg purchase in its joint program with The
World Egg Bank.142 Given the interest rates associated with fertility credit, this
presumably is a lucrative business for the lender, particularly for intended
parents who need third-party eggs to pursue assisted reproduction at all.143 Egg
acquisition currently is a small portion of the overall parenthood market.144 But
parenthood loans could expand this volume, especially if consumer credit
attracts older women with a greater need for donor eggs.145
Second, because they should perceive same-sex couples as a significant
untapped demand for parenthood loans, lenders may seek to attract them as
borrowers. In so doing, they may indirectly promote individualized decisionmaking about child-bearing by nontraditional families. Significant proportions
of gay men and women have expressed interest in parenting.146 Same-sex
couples have structural fertility barriers that alternative insemination,

Ordering, 49 ARIZ. L. REV. 599, 603–10 (2007) (revisiting arguments against financial compensation for
organ donors and responding to those arguments); Eugene Volokh, Medical Self-Defense, Prohibited
Experimental Therapies, and Payment for Organs, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1814, 1842 (2007) (discussing
concern about financial coercion, but then comparing it to dangerous occupations with higher death
rates than organ removal).
141. See Capital One Fertility, supra note 80. Eggs can be acquired through an intermediary if no
family or friends have offered them. Kenneth Baum, Golden Eggs: Towards the Rational Regulation of
Oocyte Donation, 2001 BYU L. REV. 107, 118; Bridgewater, supra note 136, at 1224; Krawiec, supra
note 11, at 20; Krawiec, supra note 133, at 63–64.
142. The World Egg Bank, Recipient’s Finance Option, supra note 93.
143. See supra III, fig.1 (reporting rates of interest). Lenders of course would not be alone in
profiting from the parenthood trade. See Daar, supra note 47, at 661–62 (referring to the provision of
reproductive technology as a “high profit business”); Krawiec, supra note 11, at 42 (“In the absence of
similar attempts to control the prices charged by providers of fertility goods and services to customers,
anti-commodification objections boil down to assertions that the ultimate supplier of the good—the egg
donor—should be the only party not profiting from the transaction, or at least she should not profit too
much.”); Lawrence J. Nelson et al., Taking the Train to a World of Strangers: Health Care Marketing
and Ethics, 19 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 36, 38 (1989) (discussing profitable fertility treatments paid in
cash as in tension with doctors’ fiduciary obligations); Noah, supra note 8, at 614 (referring to fertility
clinics as “lucrative profit centers” for the hospitals that establish them); Viviana A. Zelizer, Risky
Exchanges, in BABY MARKETS: MONEY, MORALS, AND THE NEOPOLITICS OF CHOICE (forthcoming
2009) (noting the lack of objection to medical professionals earning money for caring for babies or
body parts). For a similar discussion of taboo organ markets, see, for example, Korobkin, supra note 58,
at 46 (making a parallel argument about who profits from stem-cell research and regenerative
medicine); Volokh, supra note 140, at 1815, 1834 (2007) (noting that hospitals and surgeons are paid
“well” for their roles in transplants).
144. See SPAR, supra note 1, at 3, tbl.1-1 (reporting revenue from the 2004 fertility-treatment market
by product or service).
145. There would be some limits to this growth if, as in some other countries, the United States
restricted access to assisted reproduction for older intended parents. Heitman, supra note 16, at 92.
146. See GARY J. GATES ET AL., ADOPTION AND FOSTER CARE BY GAY AND LESBIAN PARENTS
IN THE UNITED STATES 5 (2007), available at http://www.law.ucla.edu/williamsinstitute/publications/
FinalAdoptionReport.pdf (reporting that over half of gay men and over forty percent of lesbians want
to be parents).
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surrogacy, and other procedures can address.147 In general, “the number of
unmarried persons, including those who are gay or lesbian, who seek medical
assistance to reproduce” has been on the rise.148 But the state imposes special
obstacles on same-sex couples becoming parents. Parenthood lenders cannot
counteract every obstacle, but they can weaken the financial ones.
Although assisted reproduction is generally regarded as lightly regulated,
lawmakers who do intervene often seem intent on promoting traditional family
structures. Some lawmakers have sought to restrict access to assisted
reproduction based on sexual orientation or marital status.149 No states mandate
insurance coverage for assisted reproduction for same-sex couples.150 When
states have mandated coverage, they often have defined infertility in a way that
depends on heterosexual intercourse.151 This does not necessarily steer same-sex

147. See generally Ertman, supra note 6, at 37 (“One important effect of new family forms is that
they increase agency for women and gay people generally by undermining patriarchal understandings
of family.”); Robertson, supra note 42, at 12–13 (noting how assisted reproduction enables parenting in
“novel family arrangements”).
148. ETHICS COMM. OF THE AM. SOC’Y FOR REPROD. MED., ACCESS TO FERTILITY TREATMENT
BY GAYS, LESBIANS, AND UNMARRIED PERSONS 1333, 1334 (2006) (exploring the implications of
reproduction by single and homosexual individuals); Ertman, supra note 6, at 35 (noting increases in
gay parenting likely due to alternative insemination); Robertson, supra note 9, at 349 (“[I]t is widely
assumed that several thousand children are born each year from physician insemination of single
women and lesbian couples.”). Experts cited in the media have estimated that at least five percent of
fertility clinics’ clients are gay or lesbian. See, e.g., Carl T. Hall, Gays, Lesbians Seeking Parenthood
Increasingly Turn to Infertility Clinics, SAN FRANCISCO CHRON., May 6, 2007, at A1. At the
Reproductive Science Center of the San Francisco Bay Area, the rate may be as high as ten percent. Id.
Regarding adoption, one agency reports that approximately five to ten percent of U.S. child adoptions
are by unmarried people. Adoption Services, Single Parent Adoption, http://www.
adoptionservices.org/adoption/adoption_single.htm (last visited Sept. 7, 2008). The Evan B. Donaldson
Institute reports that 1.3 percent of all adoptions completed by over 300 adoption agencies were to selfidentified homosexual parents. GATES ET AL., supra note 146, at 3. See generally William Meezan &
Jonathan Rauch, Gay Marriage, Same-Sex Parenting, and America’s Children, FUTURE CHILD., Fall
2005, at 97, 98 (noting that though “[n]o one knows just how many American children are being raised
by same-sex couples today,” conservatively, at least 166,000 children are being raised by gay and
lesbian couples).
149. See, e.g., Daar, supra note 8, at 45–46. For example, Indiana State Senator Patricia Miller tried
to introduce a bill that would have effectively prohibited single people from undergoing fertility
treatments. See id. She eventually dropped the bill because “[t]he issue [was] more complex than
anticipated.” Joshua Claybourn, Legislator Drops Assisted Reproduction Bill, IND. BARRISTER, Oct. 5,
2005, available at http://www.indianabarrister.com/archives/2005/10/legislator_drops_assisted_repr.html.
Similarly, a Virginia house bill was introduced to prohibit licensed health providers from providing
certain fertility treatments to unmarried women. Daar, supra note 8, at 45 (referring to H.B. 187, 2006
Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2006)). The bill was opposed and dropped. Id. at 46. Nevertheless, a few
states were successful in passing such legislation. Id. at 45, n.109 (referring to FLA. STAT. ANN. §
742.15(1) (2005) and TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 160.754(b) (2005)).
150. Monahan, supra note 9, at 48.
151. THOMPSON, supra note 5, at 216 (giving an example of a lesbian couple with insurance
coverage who were told that they could not satisfy definition of infertile without heterosexual
intercourse); Bridgewater, supra note 136, at 1225 (“In addition to being priced out of the market, a
number of buyers explore other markets for the most favorable legislative framework governing the
reproductive markets and their participants.”); Goodwin, supra note 7, at 18 n.89 (noting how
traditional definitions of infertility omit gay couples). As of August 27, 2008, fifteen states have
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intended parents toward adoption, for both the state and private parties
discriminate perhaps even more against same-sex couples in adoption matters.152
Financial institutions are unlikely to replicate this bias unless it relates more
directly to underwriting.153 One complication to this analysis is that clinics are a
adopted legislation requiring insurance coverage for infertility treatment to some extent. Of those
states, six have expressly defined the term “infertility” in their statutes, and all six define “infertility” in
the traditional sense. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1374.55(b) (2008) (defining infertility as
“either (1) the presence of a demonstrated condition recognized by a licensed physician and surgeon as
a cause of infertility, or (2) the inability to conceive a pregnancy or to carry a pregnancy to a live birth
after a year or more of regular sexual relations without contraception”); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §
38a-509(a) (2007) (defining infertility as the inability to conceive or sustain a pregnancy for a period of
one year); ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/356m(c) (2008) (same); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 175, § 47H
(2008) (same); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:2J-4.23 (2007) (defining infertility as “the disease or condition that
results in the abnormal function of the reproductive system such that a person is not able to:
impregnate another person; conceive after two years of unprotected intercourse if the female partner is
under 35 years of age, or one year of unprotected intercourse if the female partner is 35 years of age or
older or one of the partners is considered medically sterile; or carry a pregnancy to live birth”); R.I.
GEN. LAWS. § 27-20-20(b) (2007) (requiring an individual to be married in addition to being unable to
conceive or sustain a pregnancy). It is possible but not a foregone conclusion that monthly artificialinsemination attempts would count toward infertility. A pending federal proposal does not require
marriage, but also uses the traditional infertility screening:
Sec. 2707(a)(2) INFERTILITY DEFINED—For purposes of this section, the term
“infertility” means a disease or condition that results in the abnormal function of the
reproductive system, which results in—(A) the inability to conceive after 1 year of
unprotected intercourse, or (B) the inability to carry a pregnancy to live birth.
Family Building Act of 2007, H.R. 2892, 110th Cong. (2007). Some language is more general, but still is
likely to be construed as the traditional definition. See, e.g., H.R. 1384, 2007-08 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess.
(Ga. 2008) (defining infertility as “the condition of an otherwise presumably healthy individual who is
unable to conceive or sustain a pregnancy during a period of one year” and mandating coverage by
insurance policies of “medically necessary expenses of diagnosis and treatment of infertility”). But cf. S.
750, 2007 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 2007) (premising insurance coverage on infertility treatment
being recommended by the attending physician and performed in medically supervised facilities rather
than on meeting a statutory definition of infertility).
152. See, e.g., GATES ET AL., supra note 148, at 3 (reviewing state restrictions on adoption and foster
care); Robertson, supra note 9, at 336–37 (reviewing states prohibiting gay or lesbians from adopting);
W. Bradford Wilcox & Robin Fretwell Wilson, Bringing Up Baby: Adoption, Marriage, and the Best
Interests of the Child, 14 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 883, 888 n.29, 889–90 (2006) (listing states
prohibiting adoption by unmarried people); Christian Eichenlaub, Comment, “Minnesota Nice:” A
Comparative Analysis of Minnesota’s Treatment of Adoption by Gay Couples, 5 U. ST. THOMAS L.J.
312, 315–28 (2008) (reviewing a spectrum of state approaches to the possibility of adoption by gay and
lesbian couples). See generally THOMPSON, supra note 5, at 6 (discussing the state’s role in family
creation through adoption “only according to tacit criteria of social engineering”).
153. For example, loans to single people could be different. After the enactment of the Equal Credit
Opportunity Act (ECOA), some scholars observed that, from the perspective of women’s groups and
civil-rights organizations, “lenders continue to deny loans to creditworthy consumers and practice
gender and spousal discrimination.” Willy E. Rice, Race, Gender, “Redlining,” and the Discriminatory
Access to Loans, Credit, and Insurance: A Historical and Empirical Analysis of Consumers Who Sued
Lenders and Insurers in Federal and State Courts, 1950–1995, 33 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 583, 585–86 (1996)
(arguing that ECOA has not achieved its goal of protecting at-risk consumers and courts have been
inefficient in resolving discrimination claims). Allegations of sex discrimination in lending were
commonly tied to allegations of marital discrimination. Elwin Griffith, The Quest for Fair Credit
Reporting and Equal Credit Opportunity in Consumer Transactions, 25 U. MEM. L. REV. 37, 106 n.321
(1994) (noting that a creditor may request the designation of a courtesy title, such as “Mr.” or “Mrs.,”
only if the application form states it is optional). According to one commentator, prior to ECOA,
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major marketing and distribution channel for the loans. Some clinics have
resisted serving same-sex couples or have manifested a “heterosexual norm.”154
It is doubtful that financial institutions would sever ties to clinics on this basis
alone, but refusing to serve same-sex intended parents is probably of declining
frequency and, in some states, of dubious legality.155 Overall, one would expect a
specialty loan market to advance the objectives of individuals and same-sex
partners to become parents. In other words, lenders’ self-interest could make
them an unexpected ally to those who argue that there is nothing to fear from
allowing and enabling same-sex couples to become parents.156
Third, financing through private debt may affect the quality of assistedreproduction services. Thinking optimistically, perhaps lenders would direct
their financing business toward clinics with greater IVF success rates. This could
be particularly rational if “successful” borrowers feel a greater commitment to
pay. In addition, because multiple births impose substantial pressure on
household budgets and thus reduce a borrower’s ability to repay, perhaps
lenders would direct their business toward clinics that maximize singleton birth
rates and minimize multiple birth rates.
Thinking pessimistically, it seems unlikely that decisions of major consumer
lenders to partner with clinics would be so carefully calibrated. Even more
negatively, lenders might be more interested in financing successive rounds of
“women were forced to answer questions on credit application forms that addressed age, sex, race,
religion, birth control practices, and childbearing intentions.” Laura Eckert, Inclusion of Sexual
Orientation Discrimination in the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 103 COM. L.J. 311, 336 n.4 (1998).
154. See ROBERTS, supra note 7, at 248 (discussing how clinics reinforce traditional conceptions of
family and may not serve “single women, lesbians, welfare recipients, and other women who are not
considered good mothers”); id. at 247 (describing reproductive medicine as “more conforming than
liberating”); THOMPSON, supra note 5, at 86 (discussing a heterosexual norm in observed clinics,
particularly in the earlier days); Crossley, supra note 39, at 276 (reporting examples of clinics
discriminating against same-sex couples); Heitman, supra note 16, at 94 (discussing a stable-marriage
requirement at some clinics); Robertson, supra note 42, at 38 (balancing the rights of same-sex couples
to have children with the professional discretion of providers); Robertson, supra note 9, at 325, 349
(discussing clinics that screen out gay or lesbian patients and whether they have legal right to do so).
But see Ertman, supra note 6, at 25–26 (noting a decline in discrimination at sperm banks for lesbian
and single women who are attempting artificial or alternative insemination).
155. See, e.g., N. Coast Women’s Care Med. Group, Inc. v. San Diego County Superior Court, 44
Cal. 4th 1145 (Cal. 2008) (finding that a doctor who refused to perform certain actions to provide
fertility care to lesbian couple was not exempt from compliance with the California Unruh Civil Rights
Act); Jacob M. Appel, May Doctors Refuse Infertility Treatments to Gay Patients?, HASTINGS CENTER
REP., July–August 2006, at 20, 21 (“What remains unclear is whether physicians with bona fide
religious objections to treating certain patients are exempt from these [statutory] proscriptions.”);
Daar, supra note 8, at 22, 35, 43–44 (discussing some reproductive-medicine providers’ attempts to
discriminate on the basis of marital status, sexual orientation, or disability); see also sources cited supra
note 154.
156. For a review of the literature suggesting that children of same-sex couples are not at undue
risk, see Meezan & Rauch, supra note 148; Charlotte Patterson, Children of Lesbian and Gay Parents,
15 CURRENT DIRECTIONS PSYCHOL. SCI. 241–44 (2006) (reviewing studies and positions of major
professional organizations); Robertson, supra note 42, at 38 (“The question remains, however, whether
the right of gays to reproduce should be deemed so important that they should be protected against
discrimination by ART providers who object to gay reproduction and rearing.”).
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treatment (at potentially successively higher rates of interest), contraindicating
higher initial live birth rates.157
Understanding more about the parenthood loan market would help
determine which direction lenders might nudge the quality of assisted
reproduction. For example, knowing whether loans have been securitized, the
extent to which loans are coupled with money-back guarantees, and the fee
structure for late installment payments might help shed light on lenders’ interest
in assisted reproduction quality. The important point for now, however, is that
the arrival of lenders into assisted reproduction on a routine basis would be
likely to have a previously unexplored impact on services.
V
CONCLUSION
Not only is there a parenthood market, but consumer lenders have joined
it. Loans are available for the distinct purposes of buying the eggs of other
women, accessing assisted reproduction with wildly variable success rates, or for
adopting children—whether babies from Asia or teenagers from the American
foster-care system. The lenders range from small, nonprofit, religious
organizations to major, for-profit, financial-service corporations. Some want to
perpetuate certain understandings about the traditional family, while others
want collateral and cosignors. Lenders promote these credit products through
close partnerships with medical providers, providers of money-back guarantees,
and adoption agencies.
There is much to consider about parenthood loans—too much for one
symposium contribution. Thus, the discussion section of this article highlighted
some political-economy implications and questions for assisted reproduction.
The express interest of for-profit fertility lenders in making loans to people of
modest means, in close alliance with providers of services and money-back
guarantees, suggests that this market could touch millions of intended parents
who were thought unlikely to be able to pursue such a course. Merely by
expanding access to a broader population, the debt financing of parenthood
could increase the urgency of regulatory debates, while specific lender
preferences could affect aspects of the assisted-reproduction industry in
previously unexplored ways.

157. The structure of Capital One Fertility loans—fixed-installment loan rather than credit card or
line of credit—obscures the possibility that borrowers often are repeat-loan customers.

